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 The Retirement Board was entrusted to operate the Fireman’s Retirement Fund in such a 
way that it would not see any significant changes from how it was operated before the merger 
with PERSI.  I.C. §59-1392.  Yet, the Board now refuses to take any steps whatsoever to actually 
utilize and enforce the statutory definition of the phrase “paid firefighter” which was intended to 
govern how annual Cost of Living Allowances (COLAs) would be calculated.  In response, the 
Retirement Board does not assert that it has actually made those calculations, does not assert that 
the definitions it uses are actually identical to the definition of “paid firefighter,” does not dispute 
that harm is being done to retired firefighters in Idaho. Instead, it asserts that part-time 
firefighters are also paid firefighters, while ignoring the fact that it has absolutely no way of 
knowing whether the “reserve” firefighters actually at issue in this case are or are not paid 
firefighters.  It argues that it should be entitled to rely on a “presumption of regularity” regarding 
the conduct of Cities and Fire Districts, while ignoring that it is its own failures that are at issue 
in this case, not those of Cities.  And finally, it seeks to recast its decisions to adopt regulatory 
definitions as something other than the adoption of laws.   
 The retired fire fighters of the FRF performed decades of service for the people of Idaho 
in reliance on a promise of a pension that would be indexed to the wages of “paid fire fighters.”  
Instead, the Retirement Board is giving them a pension indexed to the wages of individuals who 
happen to meet PERSI’s extremely loose definition of “employee.”  This violates the letter and 
spirit of the FRF statute, and violates the contracts clauses of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. 
I.  The Only Unambiguous Meaning That Can Be Discerned From The Plain Language of 
the “Paid Firefighter” Definition, Is One That Supports the Appellants In This Case. 
 
 The most important question in this case is whether the term “paid firefighter” includes 
every individual who is employed by an Idaho fire department, or is limited to those who also 
meet additional criteria.  For an individual to meet the definition of “paid firefighter” requires 
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satisfaction of at least two conditions.  The individual must be “on the payroll of a” fire 
department; and, must “devote his or her principal time of employment” to that department.  I.C. 
59-1391(f).  The Retirement Board argues that anyone who is a PERSI-eligible employee, and 
who is also a firefighter meets this definition.  The Association assert the definition only 
encompasses those individuals whose primary employment is as a firefighter. 
 The statutory question depends entirely on what “employment” the definition is referring 
to when it uses the term “principal time of employment.”  The Idaho Retired Firefighters 
Association (Association) asserts it refers only to the employee’s employment, such that 
inclusion of an individual firefighter’s pay in the calculation would depend on that individual’s 
“principal time of employment.”  The Retirement Board asserts that the definition turns on 
whether that individual’s principal employment with the particular City or District is as a 
firefighter.  If the answer to this disagreement cannot be discerned directly from the language of 
the statute then there is ambiguity requiring construction. 
 This Court has long understood that the careful analysis of language is critical to 
discerning the meaning of statutes.  For instance in Hellar v. Cenarussa, 104 Idaho 858 (1983), 
the Court discerned the meaning of a state Constitutional provision governing apportionment of 
legislative districts: 
City of Boise, as an intervenor, urged an interpretation of Idaho Const. art. 3, § 5, which 
would prohibit the division of counties in the formation of legislative districts only where 
more than one county constitutes a district. The section provides that a "senatorial or 
representative district, when more than one county shall constitute the same, shall be 
composed of contiguous counties, and no county shall be divided in 
creating such districts." (Emphasis added.) The interpretive key is the word "such." The 
inclusion of that specific pronoun suggests that the prohibition does not extend to all 
legislative districts, but only to such districts which are composed of "more than one 
county." The pronoun must have an antecedent, and the prior reference to districts made 
up of more than one county clearly supplies that antecedent. 
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Id., at 861.  The present case demands the same kind of precision. To satisfy the second 
condition required to be a “paid firefighter,” the legislation requires that an individual “devotes 
his or her principal time of employment” to firefighting.  I.C. 59-1391(f).  The phrase “principal 
time of employment” is constrained by the specific determiner1 “his or her.”  The specific 
language adopted by the Legislature, and its use of a specific determiner directs the Court, and 
the Retirement Board, to determine the individual firefighter’s principal time of employment, not 
the principal time of his public employment.  The Retirement Board’s construction places the 
emphasis on “employment” and seeks to construe the statute solely within the boundaries of 
public employment.  The statute, however, in constraining the phrase “principal time of 
employment” specifically places the emphasis on the individual employee, and requires 
determination of “his or her” principal employment.   
 The Retirement Board is urging a reading of the statute that adds an additional phrase.  
By asking the Court to find that “his or her principal time of employment” means their principal 
employment for the City or District, they are inserting a word that the legislature did not include.  
The retirement Board’s construction amounts to changing the statutory definition to read “his or 
her principal time of public employment.”  The legislature, however, never indicated that public 
employment was the focus of the definition, and never included that word.  Instead, it requires 
the Board and the PERSI Director to focus on the particular employee’s principal time of 
employment. 
                                                 
1 The role of determiners is succinctly explained by numerous sources, including this one from Wikipedia: “An 
important role in English grammar is played by determiners – words or phrases that precede a noun or noun 
phrase and serve to express its reference in the context. The most common of these are the definite and 
indefinite articles, the and a(n). Other determiners in English include demonstratives such 
as this and that, possessives such as my and the boy's, and quantifiers such as all, many and three.” 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determiner#Possessive_determiner, accessed July 30, 2018.  This role is also 
discussed by the website of the British Council, which focuses on use and learning of the English language.  It 
explains that “his or her” is a “specific determiner” which is used “when we believe the listener/reader knows 
exactly what we are talking about.”  http://learnenglish.britishcouncil.org/en/english-grammar/determiners-and-
quantifiers, accessed July 30, 2018. 
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 The Association’s proffered meaning is also consistent with the “rule of the last 
antecedent clause,” a tool of statutory discernment utilized by this Court.  BHC Intermountain 
Hosp. v. Ada County, 150 Idaho 93, 244 P.3d 247 (2010).  “Under the rule of the last antecedent 
clause, a referential or qualifying clause refers solely to the last antecedent, absent a showing of 
contrary intent.”  Id., at 96, citing Mayer v. Ada County, 50 Idaho 39, 42, 293 P. 322, 323 (1930).  
As noted above, the clause “principal time of employment” follows immediately after “his or 
her,” and before the clause concerning services to or on behalf of a city fire department or fire 
district.  Since principal time of employment occupies the particular space it does, it refers back 
to “his or her” rather than to the nature of the service performed.   
 There is no doubt that if the legislature had wanted to exclude other types of employment 
from consideration, it knew how to do so.  In closely related statutes, the legislature made clear 
when it intended that only public employment for the fire district be considered.  See, e.g., I.C. 
72-1403(D), (E) and (H).  In those statutes the legislature made clear that only employment for a 
fire department would be counted for the particular purposes of those statutes.  In defining “paid 
firefighter” for purposes of the COLA, however, the legislature did not focus on fire department 
employment, or even more generally on public employment, it directed the focus to “his or her” 
employment, requiring consideration of that individual’s employment rather than merely his 
public employment.    
II.  If the Statute is Ambiguous the Canons of Construction Require the Court to Construe 
it in Favor of the Association. 
 
 To ascertain the meaning of a statute, not only must the literal words of the statute be 
examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute and its 
legislative history, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.  Sherwood & 
Sherwood & Roberts, Inc. v. Riplinger, 103 Idaho 535, 650 P.2d 442 (1981); Idaho Power Co. v. 
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Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm., 102 Idaho 744, 639 P.2d 442 (1981); State v. Groseclose, 67 Idaho 71, 
171 P.2d 863; Zazzali v. United States (In re DBSI, Inc.), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16817, *11 (9th 
Cir. Idaho Aug. 31, 2017) citing K Mart Corp v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S. Ct. 
1811, 100 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1988); see also Carpenters Health & Welfare Tr. Funds v. Robertson 
(In re Rufener Constr.), 53 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1995).  Statutory construction is a "holistic 
endeavor," Id., citing United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 
U.S. 365, 371, 108 S. Ct. 626, 98 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1988), that relies on context to be "a 
preliminary determinant of meaning," Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 168 (2012).   
 The context of the current statute shows that it was a remedial statute deisgned to protect 
the interests of the covered individuals, fire fighters and their beneficiaries.  Remedial statutes 
must  be construed broadly to effectuate their remedial purposes.  Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of 
America, 93 Idaho 26 (1969).  In context, the statute specifically sets out the benefits to be 
earned and received by full-time, career fire fighters.  I.C. §§72-1403(D),(E), and  (H).  Yet, the 
Board suggests that the benefits (specifically the COLA) should be based on the earnings of 
reserve fire fighters who might never have met the qualifications to actually receive an FRF 
pension benefit.  This does violence to the contextual reading of the statute, and assumes that the 
Legislature intended to “pull a fast one” by promising benefits to career fire fighters based on the 
earnings of occasional, part-time, reserve, or volunteer fire fighters who are principally 
employed in some other occupation altogether.  Reading the statutes contextually satisfies the 
requirement that the provisions be read in pari materia. Union Pac. R.R. v. Board of Tax 
Appeals, 103 Idaho 808, 811, 654 P.2d 901, 904 (Idaho 1982) citing Magnuson v. Idaho State 
Tax Commission, 97 Idaho 917, 556 P.2d 1197 (1976); North Idaho Jurisdiction of Episcopal 
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Churches, Inc. v. Kootenai County, 94 Idaho 644, 496 P.2d 105 (1972); Janss Corp. v. Board of 
Equalization of Blaine County, 93 Idaho 928, 478 P.2d 878 (1970). 
 If the statute is ambiguous, the tools and canons of statutory construction all point toward 
a conclusion that the COLA adjustment is to be based on the earnings of individuals, each of 
whom devotes their principal time of employment to fighting fire. 
III.  The Retirement Board and Its Director Shared a Duty to Accurately Calculate COLAs 
on the Basis of Wages of Paid Firefighters, Rather than on the Basis of Wages Paid to 
Employees. 
 
 Defendant does eventually, towards the end of its 22-page brief, admit that it has a duty 
imposed by statute to correctly calculate cost of living adjustments: 
The Legislature has set the COLA formula and imposed on the agency the task of 
collecting the relevant data and calculating the percentage increase or decrease in FRF 
retirement benefits in accordance with the formula. 
 
Respondents’ Brief, p. 20.  While it phrases the duty in slightly different terms than does the 
Association, the duty remains.  The Legislature directed PERSI and its Director not merely to 
delegate their jobs to cities, but to (in the Board’s words) “collect the relevant data.”  It has failed 
to do so. 
 The Retirement Board, as noted previously, does not even attempt to determine who is 
and who is not a paid firefighter.  It does not ask Cities or Fire Districts to determine who is a 
“paid firefighter” instead, it directs them only to determine who meets the definition of 
employee, and who meets the definition of firefighter; never inquiring whether the statutory 
definition of “paid firefighter” is met. Far from demonstrating that the Retirement Board is 
engaged in a “ministerial duty,” the record (and the admissions of Director Drum) indicate that 
the Board has entirely abdicated its duty.  Although Director Drum claimed that Cities and 
Districts were making that determination (see Appellant’s Brief, p. 13), in fact nobody makes 
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that determination whatsoever, and the definition of “paid firefighter” has become an 
irrelevancy.   
 Rendering the statute irrelevant is necessarily a breach of even a ministerial duty to apply 
the statute and calculate a figure based on its provisions.   
IV.  Because the Decision to Include Employees With Paid Firefighters In Calculating 
COLAs Was Legislative in Character and Because It Constituted a Change in How 
Plaintiffs’ Benefits Were Calculated, the Decision Violated the Contracts Clauses of the 
Idaho and United States Constitutions. 
 
 The Retirement Board seeks to have this Court adopt an unduly restricted view of what 
conduct is capable of violating the Federal and State Constitutional protections against 
impairment of contracts.  The Board improperly seeks to limit the impairment provision to 
“legislative and not executive branch action.”  (Respondent’s Brief, pp. 19-20). This is an 
incorrect statement of the law.  Action by state agencies which is “legislative in character” is 
subject to the contracts clause, regardless whether that agency is technically of the legislative 
branch.  Since the Retirement Board engaged in action of a legislative character when it adopted 
its rule defining employees, and when it decided to apply that rule in its administration of the 
Fireman’s’ Retirement Fund, it violated the contract clause. 
 The Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution states in relevant part: "No State shall . . . 
pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  The 
Contracts Clause prevents the impairment of contracts by legislative action. See New Orleans 
Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U.S. 18, 30, 8 S. Ct. 741, 31 L. Ed. 607 
(1888).  The prohibition extends to lower arms of government than the legislature, including to 
political subdivisions and agencies where power that is legislative in nature is delegated by the 
legislature.  Nowicki v. Contra Costa Cty. Employees' Ret. Ass'n, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99485, 
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*41-42, 2017 WL 2775040 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2017) quoting New Orleans Waterworks, 125 
U.S. at 31. 
 The Contracts Clause reaches "every form in which the legislative power is exerted," 
which may include certain executive actions, such as the issuance of "a regulation or order 
[through] delegated legislative authority." Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 162-63, 33 S. Ct. 220, 
57 L. Ed. 458 (1913); see also I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 986, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 77 L. Ed. 2d 
317 (1983) (describing the type of administrative rulemaking deemed legislative in nature).   
"Whether actions . . . are, in law and fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on their 
form but upon 'whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its 
character and effect.'" Kamplain v. Curry County Bd. of Com'rs, 159 F.3d 1248, 1252, 1998 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27469, *9 (10th Cir. N.M. Oct. 27, 1998) citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952, 
77 L. Ed. 2d 317, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (citation omitted); accord Roberson, 29 F.3d at 135; 
Chicago Miracle Temple Church, Inc. v. Fox, 901 F. Supp. 1333, 1343-44 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 These federal decisions are entirely consistent with Idaho decisions which have expressly 
found that any act of a “legislative character” may implicate the contracts clause.  In re Fidelity 
State Bank, 35 Idaho 797, 810 (1922); Steward v. Nelson, 54 Idaho 437, 443 (1934); Agricultural 
Products Corp. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 98 Idaho 23, 28-29 (1976). The Retirement Board 
seeks to distinguish these cases by claiming that the utility rate cases, at least, constitute the 
exercise of a “legislative function” regardless of who so exercises it.  But the distinction between 
acts of a “legislative character” which were found to implicate the contracts clause, and acts that 
constitute a “legislative function” is not at all clear, and both terms likely to refer to the same 
doctrine.  Namely, that where a state exercises power that applies in the same manner as would a 
legislative enactment, it must not impair the obligation of contracts, or its risks invalidity.   
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   In the present case, the Retirement Board adopted and applied regulations in a legislative 
fashion. The FRF was first established in 1947.  Until 1980 it was administered entirely separate 
from PERSI.  Since that time, the Retirement Board has adopted and amended its rules in ways 
that have impaired pension obligations to FRF retirees.  In 1994 the Retirement Board adopted 
Rule 100 which required PERSI participation for everyone who met the definition of 
“employee.”  IDAPA 59.01.02.100.  At the same time it adopted rules further defining 
“employee” to include individuals who work 20 hours or more for more than half of the weeks in 
a given period.  IDAPA 59.01.02.113.  The Retirement Board has also adopted a rule which 
defines the term “firefighter.”  IDAPA 59.01.02.300.   And, finally, it has chosen, since at least 
2013 to treat “employees” as if they are necessarily “paid firefighters” despite the fact that its 
own regulations specify that a “firefighter” for “[PERSI] retirement purposes” might include 
individuals “not eligible to be a ‘paid firefighter.’” Id.  Finally, the ongoing decision of the 
Retirement Board to ignore its own regulation is a legislative act.  The Retirement Board has 
adopted a regulation which specifically provides that “The provisions of Rules 300 and 301 of 
this Chapter do not apply to a ‘paid firefighter’ as defined by Sections 59-1391(f) or 72-
1403(A).”  IDAPA 59.01.02.302.  Despite this unequivocal, unambiguous regulation, the 
Retirement Board has made a decision that it will rely on the definitions of “firefighter” in 
various categories, as well as the definition of “employee” to determine who is a “paid 
firefighter.”  That decision, because it changed prospectively the benefits to be received by FRF 
retirees, was legislative in character. 
 Even if the Court does not wish to follow Deonier as an application of stare decisis, the 
same result will occur in this case based on other existing law. A violation of the contracts clause 
proceeds through a “three-step analysis.”  CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 
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379, 387 (2013). The first step is to determine whether action of a legislative character has 
operated as a substantial impairment of a contract by identifying whether a contractual 
relationship exists, whether the action in question impairs that relationship, and whether the 
impairment was substantial.  In both Nash v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 803 (1983) and Deonier v. 
PERSI, 144 Idaho 721 (1988), this Court addressed the important question of whether Firemen’s 
retirement Fund was “contractual in nature” and decided it was sufficiently so to deserve 
protection regardless of whether it met strict definitions of a “contract.”  Nash was a unanimous 
decision of the four justices who heard the case, and therefore binding on this Court, which 
found that modifications to the method of calculating cost of living adjustments were 
impermissible if they negatively affected vested pension rights.  104 Idaho at 808.   The only 
gloss added to this analysis by Deonier was the finding that such a modification not only violated 
the agreement to provide benefits, but also was an impairment of contracts.  The law of Idaho is 
clear despite the plurality nature of the Deonier decision: once vested, pension benefits are 
protected against attempts to modify the method of calculating COLAs.  While not strictly a 
contractual relationship, the promise of pensions by the State and the reliance on that promise by 
public employees, indeed the relationship between the state and retirees is  “contractual in 
nature:”   
This court has adopted the rule 'the rights of the employees in pension plans such as 
Idaho's Retirement Fund Act are vested, subject only to reasonable modification for the 
purpose of keeping the pension system flexible and maintaining its integrity.'   
 
 Deonier, 114 Idaho at 726, quoting Lynn v. Kootenai County Fire Protective Dist. # 1, 97 Idaho 
623, 627, 550 P.2d 126, 130 (1976); quoting Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514, 
446 P.2d 634, 636 (1968).  
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 A decision that results in a negative COLA, as happened here is necessarily an 
impairment of the benefit on which retired Fire Fighters have relied.  Straus v. Ketchen, 54 Idaho 
56, 70 (1933) (any change in the law “giving to one a greater and to the other a less interest or 
benefit in the contract impairs its obligation.”)  There was no dispute between the parties below 
that if reserve fire fighters were not “paid firefighters” and thus were deemed excluded from the 
COLA calculation, the COLA in 2013 and subsequent years would have been substantially larger 
in favor the retirees.  While the precise value of that effect is unknown (because the Retirement 
Board and its staff have never determined which of the reservist are in fact “paid firefighters”) 
the parties agree that the inclusion has reduced benefits to those retirees in the range of hundreds 
of thousands of dollars per year and will result, over time, in losses to them of millions of 
dollars.  Such an impairment is undoubtedly “substantial.” Straus v. Ketchen, 54 Idaho at 70 
(“The extent of the change is immaterial”).  
V.  Conclusion 
 The case presents the simple question whether the Retirement Board may substitute a 
determination that certain workers are “employees” and “firefighters” rather than making an 
actual determination whether those workers meet a statutory definition of “paid firefighters.”  
The Retired Firefighters Association and the named Plaintiffs have sought merely to have 
someone make an actual determination whether the statutory definition has been met.  But 
PERSI Director Drum has refused to do so, the Retirement Board has refused to do so, and there 
is no evidence that Cities or Fire Districts are actually doing so.  The briefs to date reveal little 
more than complex efforts to avoid simply doing the job that the Legislature imposed.   
 Rather than condoning the dodging of work, the Court should remand this matter to the 
Industrial Commission, with instructions to remand it to the Retirement Board with a direction to 
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determine who are paid firefighters, and who are not, and to calculate COLAs on the basis of 
their earnings.  That is the simple task assigned by the Legislature, which the Executive has 
sought to avoid, the avoidance of which it now seeks to stamp with the Judiciary’s imprimatur.  
 DATED this 30th day of July, 2018. 
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      James M. Piotrowski 
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